2016-04-06 Bjorn Palmertz Influence against Sweden and the repercussions for a psychological defence Bjorn Palmertz Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies.

En presentation över ämnet: "2016-04-06 Bjorn Palmertz Influence against Sweden and the repercussions for a psychological defence Bjorn Palmertz Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies."— Presentationens avskrift:

1 2016-04-06 Bjorn Palmertz Influence against Sweden and the repercussions for a psychological defence Bjorn Palmertz Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies

2 2016-04-06 Bjorn Palmertz The challenge

3 2016-04-06 Bjorn Palmertz Context

4 2016-04-06 Bjorn Palmertz Context Population trust Source ciriticism Credibility of traditional media National political fragmentation Migration crisis Public opinion on national security National police reorganization Armed forces reorientation NATO collaboration Nordic collaboration

5 2016-04-06 Bjorn Palmertz Daesh

6 2016-04-06 Bjorn Palmertz Branding and symbolism

7 2016-04-06 Bjorn Palmertz Credibility of caliphate

8 2016-04-06 Bjorn Palmertz Glorifying leaders

9 2016-04-06 Bjorn Palmertz Religion

10 2016-04-06 Bjorn Palmertz Recruitment

11 2016-04-06 Bjorn Palmertz Sense of community

12 2016-04-06 Bjorn Palmertz Adventure and capabilities

13 2016-04-06 Bjorn Palmertz Humanitarian motives

14 2016-04-06 Bjorn Palmertz Martyr biographies

15 2016-04-06 Bjorn Palmertz Successes

16 2016-04-06 Bjorn Palmertz Russia

17 2016-04-06 Bjorn Palmertz Rysslands utrikespolitiska avsikt In its public diplomacy, Russia will seek to ensure its objective perception in the world, develop its own effective means of information influence on public opinion abroad, strengthen the role of Russian mass media in the international information environment providing them with essential state support, as well as actively participate in international information cooperation, and take necessary measures to counteract information threats to its sovereignty and security. Possibilities offered by new information and communications technologies will be widely used in these activities. Russia will seek to develop a set of legal and ethical norms for the safe use of such technologies. Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation 2013

18 2016-04-06 Bjorn Palmertz Rysslands ekonomi Underskott i ekonomin på ca. 3% 2016 Försvarsbudget har ökat stadigt sedan 2011, men 2016 beräknas enbart ca. 1% Rysslands BNP är storleksmässigt jämförbar med Italiens, men med högre köpkraft

19 2016-04-06 Bjorn Palmertz Ryska Troll Internet Research Agency utanför S:t Petersburg – ”Trollfabriken” Ca 600 anställda 70 miljoner kronor i budget Medarbetare kommenterar på sociala medier, forum och bloggar Nationellt och internationellt Personal för enkla såväl som kvalificerade uppgifter

20 2016-04-06 Bjorn Palmertz Cognitive dissonance 2014-03-04 2014-04-17 2015-12-17 “Russian soldiers have not occupied government buildings and surrounded Ukrainian military bases on the Crimean Peninsula” “Of course, the Russian servicemen did back the Crimean self-defence forces. They acted in a civil but a decisive and professional manner, as I’ve already said.” “It's all nonsense, there are no Russian units, special forces or instructors in the east of Ukraine” “We never said there were not people there who carried out certain tasks including in the military sphere.”

21 2016-04-06 Bjorn Palmertz Russian media situation Deliberate strategy to place media under state control Coordination from highest level Direct control of RT, Sputnik, Rossiya Segodnya etc. Indirect control through loyal oligarchs Increased budget and spending during 2015 No freedom of the press State control through ROSKOMNADZOR (FCC equiv.) Social media – example VK Trolls Regulation for foreign ownership of russian media

22 2016-04-06 Bjorn Palmertz Control over Russian national information environment

23 2016-04-06 Bjorn Palmertz Building a perception gap

24 2016-04-06 Bjorn Palmertz Linking Sweden to Russias ”enemies”

25 2016-04-06 Bjorn Palmertz Demonstrating military capability

26 2016-04-06 Bjorn Palmertz Interference with infrastructure projects

27 2016-04-06 Bjorn Palmertz Influencing internal debates

28 2016-04-06 Bjorn Palmertz Connection to right wing extremists

29 2016-04-06 Bjorn Palmertz Psychological defense development

30 2016-04-06 Bjorn Palmertz Slutsatser och implikationer Sverige har ett viktigt geografiskt läge och historiska spänningar gentemot Ryssland Ett öppet samhälle, bristande politisk stabilitet och nya utmaningar innebär sårbarheter Sverige, EU och NATO har än så länge en bristande infrastruktur och myndighetssamverkan för strategisk kommunikation Teknikutvecklingen har gett Ryssland fler möjligheter att genomföra riktad påverkan och begränsat möjligheten för andra att påverka den Ryska befolkningen Ryssland har en mer offensiv tolkning av påverkan än västvärlden och vi måste planera utifrån deras perspektiv, inte våra egna Spelreglerna för framgång skiljer sig mellan Ryssland och västvärlden Vaksamhet krävs vad gäller ryskt agerande genom stöd till och kommunikation genom svenska grupper och individer, bl a inom den extremistiska sfären

31 2016-04-06 Bjorn Palmertz Psychological defense development Threat awareness Mandate, roles and resource allocation Coordinated strategic communication Active channels of communication Planning, training and exercises for critical functions Knowledge support and dialogue with the media Extremism and radicalization Support to the education system Legislation